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The irreducibility of consciousness 
Amy Kind 
Claremont McKenna College 
Abstract 
In this paper, by analyzing the Chalmers-Searle debate about Chalmers’ 
zombie thought experiment, I attempt to determine the implications 
that the irreducibility of consciousness has for the truth of materialism. 
While Chalmers claims that the irreducibility of consciousness forces us 
to embrace dualism, Searle claims that it has no deep metaphysical im-
port and, in particular, that it is fully consistent with his materialist the-
ory of mind. I argue that this disagreement hinges on the notion of physi-
cal identity in play in the discussion. Clarifying this notion in turn helps 
to clarify what it means to claim that consciousness is irreducible, and 
provides insight into the implications that the truth of this claim would 
have for the dualism-materialism debate. Ultimately, I suggest that the 
sort of irreducibility that can be motivated by the zombie thought ex-
periment is not sufficient to require the rejection of materialism. 
The question of whether there can be a physical reduction of con-
sciousness once seemed to rest largely on the plausibility of two now-
familiar thought experiments — Frank Jackson’s Mary, the color 
scientist, and Thomas Nagel’s bat. More recently, the focus of the 
irreducibility debate has shifted to David Chalmers’ thought experi-
ment about zombies, creatures who are physically indiscernible from 
humans but phenomenologically void. Confronted with this thought 
experiment, the materialist has appeared to have three options. She 
can reject the claim that zombies are conceivable, she can reject the 
claim that that the conceivability of zombies entails their possibility, or 
she can reject the claim that the possibility of zombies entails the 
irreducibility of consciousness. It has been generally assumed, how-
ever, that to accept all three of these claims — and thereby to accept 
the irreducibility of consciousness — would be to admit defeat. 
 In this paper, I want to examine the merits of this assumption that 
the irreducibility of consciousness is incompatible with materialism. I 
will come to this issue by way of John Searle’s criticism of Chalmers’ 
thought experiment. Both Chalmers and Searle are proponents of the 
irreducibility of consciousness, but, interestingly, they disagree about 
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its consequences.1 While Chalmers claims that the irreducibility of 
consciousness forces us to embrace dualism, Searle claims that it has 
no deep metaphysical import and, in particular, that it is fully consis-
tent with his materialist theory of mind.2 Getting to the bottom of 
this philosophical disagreement will provide us not only with some 
important clarification about what it means to claim that conscious-
ness is irreducible but also with some insight into the implications that 
the truth of this claim would have for the dualism-materialism debate. 
Ultimately, I will suggest that the sort of irreducibility that can be 
motivated by the zombie thought experiment is not sufficient to 
require the rejection of materialism.  
I. Chalmers’ naturalistic dualism vs. Searle’s biological 
naturalism 
The sense of reducibility in play in Chalmers’ discussion of conscious-
ness is that of reductive explanation. For Chalmers, a phenomenon is 
reductively explainable in physical terms if and only if it is logically 
supervenient on some lower-level physical properties.3 A reductive 
explanation, though not necessarily fully illuminating, will nonethe-
less remove some of the mystery about the higher-level phenomenon 
in question by giving us an explanation of it wholly in terms of the 
simpler properties. The claim that consciousness is not reductively 
explainable thus depends on the claim that consciousness does not 
logically supervene on physical properties. Chalmers takes such 
properties to be the fundamental properties invoked by a completed 
 
1 In Chalmers (1996) and Searle (1992). 
2 Although Searle often seems to avoid the label ‘materialist,’ this is not because 
he thinks of himself as a dualist, but rather because he thinks that terms like ‘dualist’ 
and ‘materialist’ are pieces of an ‘obsolete Cartesian vocabulary.’ Searle (1997b, 
162). According to Searle, materialism is often taken to imply the falsity of naïve 
mentalism. Though he thinks this implication is mistaken, he nonetheless refrains 
from calling himself a materialist in order to avoid association with antimentalism. 
See Searle (1992, 52-5).  
3 See Chalmers (1996, 48). He does qualify this claim, noting that it is not as 
clear that logical supervenience suffices for reductive explanation than that it is 
necessary for it. But rather than limiting himself only to the necessity claim, he 
prefers ‘to note that there is a useful notion of reductive explanation such that 
logical supervenience is both necessary and sufficient.’ (1996, 48) 
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theory of physics, with the added stipulation that a world’s physical 
laws should be included in the supervenience base. I will return to 
this stipulation below, arguing that it is considerably more significant 
than Chalmers would have us believe; in particular, I will suggest that 
it turns out to be an important key to unraveling his disagreement 
with Searle. But it will be useful to postpone this discussion until we 
have before us a more complete picture of the disagreement. 
 The heart of Chalmers’ case for the failure of logical superven-
ience lies in his argument concerning the logical possibility of zom-
bies.4 As I have noted, a philosophical zombie is a being physically 
indiscernible from a human being but phenomenologically void. My 
zombie twin, for example, has a brain and body that are physically 
identical to (i.e., physically indiscernible from) mine but has no 
phenomenally conscious states. There is nothing it is like to be my 
zombie twin. As Chalmers claims, and as many philosophers have 
agreed, there does not seem to be any logical contradiction in the 
notion of a philosophical zombie. In fact, there does not seem to be 
any logical contradiction in the notion of a whole zombie world, a 
world that is physically identical to the actual world though phenome-
nologically empty. But from the logical possibility of a zombie world 
it seems to follow directly that phenomenal properties do not logi-
cally supervene on physical properties, and the failure of logical 
supervenience in turn precludes any reductive explanation of phe-
nomenal consciousness. 
 Given this argument, Chalmers views the rejection of materialism as 
only a short step away. The zombie world, in which there is no con-
sciousness, is by hypothesis physically identical to the actual world. 
Thus, the fact that there is consciousness in the actual world must be a 
further fact, over and above all the physical facts. Materialism, which is 
committed to the claim that all facts are physical facts, is therefore false. 
 Having abandoned materialism, Chalmers adopts in its place a 
version of property dualism that he calls naturalistic dualism. Although 
he accepts the materialist claim that the only substances in the world 
are physical ones, he departs from materialism in claiming that some 
of those substances have phenomenal properties that cannot be reduc-
 
4 Though he relies most heavily on the zombie argument, Chalmers gives four 
other arguments as well. For all five arguments, see Chalmers (1996, 93-106). 
Chalmers’ zombie argument has been much discussed. For two interesting recent 
discussions, see Perry (2001) and Levine (2001). 
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tively explained in terms of physical properties. Importantly, however, 
the irreducibility of phenomenal properties entails only that they are 
logically independent of physical properties. We need not conclude 
that phenomenal properties are actually independent of physical 
properties, and in fact, Chalmers denies that they are. He devotes 
much of his book to developing a theory of the systematic dependence 
of phenomenal properties on physical properties in the actual world. 
In short, though he denies that consciousness supervenes logically on 
the physical, he nonetheless believes that it supervenes naturally on 
the physical (hence the naturalistic dualism). 
 To characterize Chalmers’ view, then, we might say that in the 
actual world ‘consciousness arises from a physical basis, even though it 
is not entailed by that basis.’ (Chalmers 1996, 125) As Chalmers 
himself acknowledges, there is only a fine line between this purport-
edly dualistic view and the views of many of his opponents who claim 
to be materialists. Interestingly, in some cases there may not even 
seem to be any such line at all. In such cases, however, Chalmers 
claims that his opponents are fooling themselves about the ontological 
commitments of their theories. 
 One such opponent is Searle, who advocates a view that he calls 
biological naturalism:  
Consciousness, in short, is a biological feature of human and certain 
animal brains. It is caused by neurobiological processes and is as much a 
part of the natural biological order as any other biological features such 
as photosynthesis, digestion, or mitosis. (Searle 1992, 90)  
According to Chalmers, Searle’s view contains an implicit admission 
of dualism, since the claim that the brain causes consciousness sug-
gests that consciousness is something over and above the brain. Thus, 
Chalmers claims that Searle should be categorized as a property 
dualist rather than as a materialist, ‘despite Searle’s own view of the 
matter.’ (Chalmers 1996, 370, fn. 2) 
 Importantly, this is despite Searle’s own view of the matter. Searle 
not only explicitly denies that his claims about the brain’s causing 
consciousness commit him to property dualism, but he also steadfastly 
rejects the claim that the irreducibility of consciousness entails prop-
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erty dualism.5 Irreducibility, according to Searle, ‘has no deep meta-
physical consequences for the unity of our overall scientific world 
view.’ (Searle 1992, 122) 
 This presents us with our puzzle. Chalmers and Searle both deny 
that consciousness is reducible to physical facts, and they both accept 
that consciousness arises from a physical basis. There thus seems to be 
nothing that could justify classifying Chalmers as a dualist but Searle 
as a materialist. Should we conclude that the dualist/materialist 
contrast is a mere terminological distinction without a substantive 
difference?6 In fact, I think the answer to this question is ‘no’ — the 
disagreement between Chalmers and Searle is a nontrivial one, and it 
points to a fundamental unclarity in how we are to draw the dividing 
line between materialism and dualism. 
II. Two senses of irreducibility 
Perhaps the most natural response when presented with our puzzle 
would be to point a finger at the term ‘irreducibility’ as the source of 
the trouble. Indeed given how many different kinds of reduction 
abound in the philosophical literature it would not be surprising if it 
were to turn out that Chalmers and Searle have different things in 
mind when they claim that consciousness is irreducible. Searle himself 
separates five kinds of reduction: ontological, property-ontological, 
theoretical, logical, and causal.7 What distinguishes these reductions 
from one another is the sort of reducing entity under consideration: 
objects, properties, theories, sentences, or causal powers. But all five 
of these types of reduction have something in common, namely, the 
idea of ‘nothing but’ — in general, when we reduce A to B we show 
that A is nothing but B, or that A consists in nothing more than B — 
and I think we can pretty quickly rule out the suggestion that the 
differences among these types of reductions matter for making sense 
of the Chalmers-Searle dispute. 
 
5 For his denial that he is a property dualist, see Searle (1992, 252, fn. 4); for his 
remarks about the irreducibility of consciousness, see e.g. Searle (1992, 116); Searle 
(1997c, 174). 
6 Chalmers considers, and rejects, the suggestion that their disagreement is 
merely terminological. See Chalmers (1996, 130). 
7 See Searle (1992, 112-116). 
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 There is, however, another way in which an ambiguity in the 
notion of irreducibility might come into play. Chalmers, recall, is 
concerned primarily with reductive explanation, whereas Searle is 
interested in reduction. It will thus be useful to explore how 
Chalmers’ notion of reductive explanation relates to the general 
notion of reduction. 
 First, notice that in order to reduce some phenomenon A to some 
other phenomenon B, we must be able to reductively explain A in 
terms of B. If we could not give a reductive explanation of A in terms 
of B, then facts about A could not logically supervene on facts about B. 
This would mean, however, that facts about A are over and above facts 
about B, and so we would not be able to reduce A to B. Thus, 
Chalmers’ claim that consciousness cannot be reductively explained 
clearly entails the claim that there can be no reduction of conscious-
ness in any of Searle’s five senses. 
 The converse entailment, however, does not hold. While reductive 
explanation is required for reduction, reduction is not required for 
reductive explanation.8 Consider the standard sort of case where 
reduction fails, namely, a phenomenon that is multiply realizable. If a 
phenomenon can be realized in many different physical substrates, 
then we cannot reduce it to any particular physical substrate. Tem-
perature, for example, is realized differently in gases from how it is 
realized in plasmas; though the temperature of a gas is the mean 
kinetic energy of the molecules, plasmas do not even consist of mole-
cules but rather of dissociated atoms. Nonetheless, the fact that tem-
perature cannot be reduced to mean molecular kinetic energy does 
not prevent scientists from giving reductive explanations of the phe-
nomenon.9 What precludes the possibility of a reductive explanation 
of some phenomenon A in physical terms is the failure of A to super-
vene logically on the physical. But the mere fact that A is multiply 
realizable does not entail such a failure. 
 This suggests a solution to our puzzle. Although both Chalmers 
and Searle claim that 
(a) Consciousness is irreducible 
 
8 Chalmers makes this latter point in Chalmers (1996, 43). 
9 For a discussion of the reducibility of temperature, see Churchland (1986, 
356). 
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we now see that there are two nonequivalent ways of interpreting this 
claim: 
(a1) There can be no reduction of consciousness 
(a2) There can be no reductive explanation of consciousness. 
Importantly, then, there are two different ways of interpreting 
Searle’s claim that 
(b) The irreducibility of consciousness has no antimaterialist conse-
quences 
namely, 
(b1) There would be no antimaterialist consequences if consciousness 
were unable to be reduced. 
(b2) There would be no antimaterialist consequences if consciousness 
were unable to be reductively explained. 
Moreover, just as a1 does not imply a2, b1 does not imply b2. Since 
reduction is not required for reductive explanation, the claim that a 
phenomenon cannot be reductively explained is a stronger claim than 
the claim that the phenomenon cannot be reduced. There might be 
important metaphysical consequences were it the case that conscious-
ness could not be reductively explained even if there would be no 
such consequences were it the case that there could be no reduction 
of consciousness. 
 We thus have an easy way to reconcile the seemingly incompatible 
claims of Chalmers and Searle. When Searle claims that the irreduci-
bility of consciousness is consistent with materialism, he means only to 
be claiming b1, whereas when Chalmers denies that the irreducibility 
of consciousness is consistent with materialism, he means only to be 
denying b2. Though it seems that they disagree about the metaphysical 
implications of the irreducibility of consciousness, their disagreement 
really hinges on an ambiguity in the notion of irreducibility. 
 Unfortunately, however, we cannot take this easy way out. The 
proposed reconciliation suggests that Searle, like Chalmers, rejects 
b2. But if Searle admits that there would be anti-materialist conse-
quences were it the case that consciousness could not be reductively 
explained, then in order to remain a materialist he would have to 
reject a2. Yet it is not clear that this avenue is open to him. The prob-
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lem is that Searle seems to accept the conceivability of a zombie 
world; as he says, there is no contradiction in the assumption of ‘a 
world where all the physical particles were exactly like ours, with a 
zombie doppelgänger for each of us, in which there was no con-
sciousness at all.’ (Searle 1997b, 147) Assuming that the conceivability 
of zombies precludes a reductive explanation of consciousness, as 
Chalmers has argued, Searle would be committed to a2.10 
III. Zombies and living rocks 
The above discussion rules out our suggestion that an ambiguity 
between reduction and reductive explanation was the source of the 
trouble. But importantly, it offers us an alternative suggestion, 
namely, that we might be able to trace the problem back to issues 
relating to zombies — either their conceivability or the implications 
thereof. Recall that the fact that we can conceive of a zombie world is 
supposed not only to preclude the possibility of a reductive explana-
tion of consciousness, but also to entail the rejection of materialism. 
Chalmers’ argument for the latter was straightforward: 
(1) We can conceive of a zombie world (a world that is physically identi-
cal to our world but without any consciousness). 
(2) Thus, a zombie world is logically possible. 
(3) Thus, the fact that there is consciousness in our world is a further 
fact, over and above all the physical facts about our world. 
(4) Thus, materialism is false. 
Given that we have been interpreting Searle as accepting (1) but 
denying (4), we would be able to solve our puzzle were it the case 
that he rejects Chalmers’ inference from (1) to (2), from (2) to (3), or 
from (3) to (4). 
 Searle’s discussion of Chalmers’ work draws our attention to the 
move from (2) to (3). It seems that he wants to deny that the logical 
possibility of a zombie world entitles us to the claim that, in the actual 
world, facts about consciousness are over and above the physical facts:  
 
10 One might think that there is another easy way out, namely, to treat Searle’s 
use of the terms ‘reduction’ and ‘irreducibility’ as nonstandard (and indeed, some of 
his own remarks seem to support this suggestion). But the considerations I raise in 
the text will also count against this attempt to solve our puzzle. 
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If I were to imagine a miraculous world in which the laws of nature are 
different, I can easily imagine a world which has the same microstructure 
as ours but has all sorts of different higher-level properties. I can imagine 
a world in which pigs can fly, and rocks are alive, for example. But the 
fact that I can imagine these science fiction cases does not show that life 
and acts of flying are not physical properties and events. (Searle 1997b, 
147–8)11 
Chalmers has responded by arguing that the passage just quoted 
contains a confusion: 
To show that flying is nonphysical, we would need to show that the 
world’s physical structure is consistent with the absence of flying. From 
the fact that one can add flying pigs to the world, nothing follows. Sec-
ond, the scenario he describes is not consistent. A world with flying pigs 
would have a lot of extra matter hovering meters above the earth, for 
example, so it could not possibly have the same physical structure as 
ours. Putting these points together: the idea of a world physically identi-
cal to ours but without flying, or without pigs, or without rocks, is self-
contradictory. (Chalmers 1997, 164) 
Chalmers should be granted this point. Nonetheless, it is not clear 
that his response adequately deals with Searle’s suggestion. Even if we 
dismiss Searle’s flying pig example as inconsistent, that example is 
only one of two that Searle gives. He also suggests that we can con-
ceive of a world physically identical to our world in which rocks are 
alive — a suggestion that Chalmers’ response ignores. Once we 
attend to this second example, we see that it cannot be as easily 
dismissed as the example of flying pigs. Though a world physically 
identical to ours but ‘without flying, or without pigs, or without 
rocks’ is self-contradictory, a world physically identical to ours but 
with living rocks is not — or, at least, not obviously so. And therein 
lies a problem for Chalmers. If we can conceive of a world physically 
identical to our world but which contains a rock endowed with life, 
then such a world is logically possible; by parity of reasoning with the 
zombie argument, we reach the unpalatable conclusion that the prop-
 
11 Strictly speaking, this passage leaves upon the question of whether Searle is 
rejecting the inferences from (1) to (2) or from (2) to (3). However, Searle’s own 
history of reliance on conceivability arguments strongly suggests that his objection 
must be to the latter of these two inferences. 
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erty of being alive fails to be reductively explainable in terms of 
physical facts.  
 In order to reject this claim about the irreducibility of life, 
Chalmers will have to argue that, contrary to how it might initially 
seem to us, we cannot really conceive of a world physically identical 
to ours in which rocks are alive. But given that his arguments for the 
irreducibility of consciousness and the failure of materialism depend 
on the conceivability of a zombie world, pursuing this line of response 
imposes on Chalmers an extremely delicate task. Any arguments to 
the effect that we are not really conceiving of what we think we are 
conceiving will have to apply to the case of the living-rock world 
without also applying to the case of the zombie world. 
 The difficulty of this task is exemplified by Chalmers’ treatment of 
a similar objection to the zombie argument that arises from reflection 
on vitalism. Suppose the vitalists had offered the following argument 
to establish their position: 
(1*) We can conceive of a lifeless world (a world that is physically 
identical to our world but without any living things). 
(2*) Thus, a lifeless world is logically possible. 
(3*) Thus, the fact that there is life in our world is a further fact, over 
and above all the physical facts about our world. 
(4*) Thus, vitalism is true. 
Vitalism, however, is surely false. Thus, unless we are willing to reject 
(1*), it looks as if there is something wrong with this argument 
structure.  
 Unsurprisingly, Chalmers wants to reject (1*). He attempts to 
justify this rejection primarily by reminding us of the original motiva-
tion for the vitalist view. The vitalist theory grew out of skepticism 
that we could explain all the complex functions associated with life 
(reproduction, behavioral adaptations, etc.) merely in terms of physi-
cal mechanisms. What the vitalists primarily sought, according to 
Chalmers, was an explanation of those functions, and so once such 
explanations were developed, ‘vitalist doubts mostly melted away.’ 
(Chalmers 1996, 109) 
 As a historical point, this is no doubt correct. When science devel-
oped an adequate theory of how physical processes account for the 
functions in question, vitalism died out. But all this shows is that 
people stopped believing that what accounted for life in the actual 
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world was some sort of élan vital. To convince us to reject (1*), 
Chalmers needs to show something stronger, namely, that there is 
something incoherent about the notion of a lifeless world. On this 
score, however, he has very little to say. The vitalism example in this 
way puts pressure on Chalmers’ argument against materialism. Insofar 
as we do seem able to conceive of a lifeless world, despite the fact that 
we are committed to the physicality of life, there must be something 
wrong with the vitalism argument — and, correspondingly, with the 
zombie argument. 
 Notice, however, that the strength of the objection to Chalmers 
depends on the plausibility of the claim that a lifeless world is con-
ceivable. We thus might reasonably think that Searle owes us some 
explanation of how exactly we are to conceive the lifeless world — 
or, to be fair, since Searle’s own example was not of a world physically 
identical to ours with no life but rather of a world physically identical 
to ours with extra life, we might reasonably think that he owes us some 
further description of what exactly we are conceiving when we are 
conceiving the living-rock world.12 
 Once we look more closely at Searle’s example, however, we find 
that his description of the living-rock world reveals what really sepa-
rates the two philosophers. Importantly, when Searle indicates the 
respect in which that world is indiscernible from ours, he puts the 
point in terms of microstructure. The reason that he thinks that there is 
no logical contradiction in supposing that there could be a world with 
the same microstructure as ours in which rocks were alive is that he 
thinks microstructure alone is not sufficient for life. According to 
Searle, whether an object with a certain microstructure has the prop-
erty of being alive depends on the laws of the world that the object 
inhabits. In our world, and in any world with our laws of nature, 
objects with the microstructure of rocks will not be alive. But he also 
thinks that there would be no logical contradiction in the supposition 
that, in a world that lacks our laws of nature, an object with a micro-
structure identical to an actual-world rock has the property of being 
 
12 In fact, this might be too charitable to Chalmers. When arguing for the logical 
possibility of zombies, Chalmers tries to shift the burden of proof to his opponents. 
There he claims that, in general, the burden of proof lies on the person who claims 
that a given description is logically impossible. (Chalmers 1996, 96) Thus, to make an 
ad hominen point, it might seem that the burden is on him to convince us that our 
supposition of a lifeless world contains a contradiction. 
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alive. Likewise, when Searle discusses Chalmers’ zombie case, he 
again puts the point in terms of microstructure. He describes a zom-
bie as ‘physically identical to a normal human being down to the last 
molecule,’ and, perhaps more tellingly, he describes the zombie world 
simply as one in which all the physical ‘particles’ are exactly like ours. 
(Searle 1997b, 147) Unfortunately, however, this crucially underde-
scribes the zombie world that Chalmers has asked us to imagine. For 
Chalmers, the zombie world does not just have the same physical 
microstructure — the same physical particles — as the actual world, 
but it also shares all of the physical laws of the actual world. As I noted 
in Section I above, Chalmers stipulates the inclusion of the physical 
laws of a world in the set of physical facts about it. By hypothesis, the 
zombie world is physically identical to the actual world, which means 
that the zombie world, by hypothesis, is one in which all the physical 
particles not only are the same as those in the actual world but also 
are governed by all the same physical laws as in the actual world.  
IV. Two senses of physical identity 
The preceding discussion has thus brought us to the heart of the 
matter, allowing us to pinpoint the issue between Chalmers and 
Searle. Though it looks as if they disagree about the implications of the 
conceivability of a zombie world, in fact they disagree over its con-
ceivability. This disagreement is hidden, however, by an ambiguity in 
the notion of ‘physically identical.’ Let us explicitly distinguish the two 
different ways to understand ‘physical identity’: 
Microphysical Identity: Two worlds are microphysically identical if and only 
if they have the same physical microstructures. 
 
Lawful Microphysical Identity: Two worlds are lawfully microphysically 
identical if and only if they (a) have the same physical microstructures; 
and (b) have the same physical laws. 
We can thus summarize the dispute as follows. While Searle requires 
only microphysical identity for two worlds to count as physically 
identical, Chalmers requires lawful microphysical identity for two 
worlds to count as physically identical. 
 Once we have drawn this distinction, the suspicion arises that 
Chalmers trades on this ambiguity in putting forth his zombie argu-
The Irreducibility of Consciousness 245
ment. Since the failure of local supervenience does not imply the 
failure of global supervenience, in order to show that consciousness 
cannot be reductively explained he needs to show (as he himself 
admits) that consciousness does not globally logically supervene on 
the physical facts. However, given that he thinks not only that it is 
easier, practically speaking, to defend the local version of the zombie 
argument than the global version, but also that ‘if consciousness 
supervenes at all, it almost certainly supervenes locally,’ he generally 
relies on the local version of the argument, noting that the argument 
could be transformed into a global version with ‘straightforward 
alterations’ if need be. (Chalmers 1996, 93) The problem is that the 
local version of the zombie argument cannot sensibly employ lawful 
microphysical identity. Although I defined both kinds of physical 
identity in terms of worlds, microphysical identity can be quite natu-
rally stretched to cover physical identity between individuals as well: 
two individuals are microphysically identical if and only if they have 
the same physical microstructures. In contrast, lawful microphysical 
identity cannot be similarly stretched — or at least, it cannot be 
stretched in a way that allows it to be usefully invoked in arguments 
involving local supervenience. Laws are properties of worlds, not of 
individuals in the worlds. Perhaps the best we can do to apply lawful 
microphysical identity to individuals would be to say that two indi-
viduals are lawfully microphysically identical if and only if (a) they 
have the same physical microstructures; and (b) the worlds in which 
they are located have the same physical laws. 
 If this is right, then in order to conceive of my zombie twin as 
lawfully microphysically identical to me, I would have to build details 
about the world in which she exists into my conceiving of her. And it 
is not hard to see that this violates the spirit of running the zombie 
argument locally. Suppose, to use one of Chalmers’ examples, that in 
order to determine whether value supervenes locally on the physical I 
conceive of an exact physical replica of the Mona Lisa. Since the 
replica clearly will not have the same value as the Mona Lisa itself, my 
thought experiment shows that value cannot supervene locally on 
physical properties. The value of the Mona Lisa depends on something 
besides its physical constitution, namely, its origin — it matters to the 
value of a painting who painted it. As Chalmers says, ‘In general, local 
supervenience of a property on the physical fails if that property is 
somehow context-dependent — that is, if an object’s possession of 
that property depends not only on the object’s physical constitution 
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but also on its environment and its history.’ (Chalmers 1996, 34) 
Notice what this suggests. When conceiving of a physically identical 
replica of some actual world object (or person) for the purpose of 
evaluating whether some property supervenes locally on the physical, 
we are required to conceive of the replica independent of its context. This 
requirement prevents my conceiving of a zombie replica that is law-
fully microphysically identical to me, for to conceive of this, I have to 
build in to my conceiving facts about the laws that hold in the world 
where the replica exists, facts not about its constitution but (at least 
broadly speaking) about its environment. 
 When we are operating at the level of an individual zombie — which 
is the level at which Chalmers asks us to operate — the claim that a 
zombie is ‘physically identical’ to a conscious being must thus be a claim 
about microphysical identity. Importantly, as we have seen, this is a claim 
with which Searle agrees. He admits the conceivability of a being that is 
phenomenologically void despite being microphysically identical to a 
conscious being. But now, what happens when we move to the level of a 
zombie world, i.e., when we switch the argument from local to global 
supervenience? Doing so was supposed to involve only straightforward 
alterations but, if we are to conceive what Chalmers wants us to con-
ceive, the alterations are not so straightforward after all. It is not just a 
matter of increasing the zombie population, that is, we are not just being 
asked to conceive of an entire world of these beings, each of whom is 
microphysically identical to a conscious being in the actual world. Rather, 
Chalmers wants the world itself to be lawfully microphysically identical 
to the actual world. 
V. Irreducibility, revisited 
Let us recall the puzzle with which we began. Despite their apparent 
agreement about the irreducibility of consciousness, Chalmers classi-
fied himself a dualist while Searle classified himself a materialist. We 
can now see that Chalmers and Searle do not, in fact, agree that 
consciousness is irreducible — or at least not in the same sense of 
irreducibility. The difference between microphysical and lawful 
microphysical identity infects their claims about irreducibility. 
Chalmers is committed to the claim that consciousness is what we 
might call lawfully microphyscially irreducible, i.e., that it cannot be 
reduced to physical properties plus physical laws. At best, however, 
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Searle is committed only to the claim that consciousness is what we 
might call microphysically irreducible, i.e., that it cannot be reduced to 
physical properties. And, since this difference seems enough to justify 
the fact that Chalmers and Searle fall on different sides of the dualist-
materialist divide, we have solved our puzzle. 
 In doing so, however, I think we do more than simply settle an 
exegetical question about the theories of Chalmers and Searle. Rather, 
we are given some illumination about the significance of the debate 
about irreducibility and, perhaps even more importantly, about the 
nature of the divide between dualism and materialism. In this last 
section of this paper, I would like to discuss some of the lessons that I 
think we can learn from the preceding discussion. 
 The debate between dualism and materialism is often cast in terms 
of the issue of the physicality of mental states. To the question, ‘Are 
mental states physical?,’ dualists answer ‘no’ while materialists answer 
‘yes.’ Often, the focus of the question narrows, and it is cast specifi-
cally in terms of consciousness: ‘Is consciousness physical?’ But again, 
an answer to this question is supposed to dictate on which side of the 
dualist-materialist divide one stands. 
 One tentative conclusion that can be drawn from our discussion of 
Chalmers and Searle is that this way of casting things is at best mis-
leading (and at worst, simply a mistake). Once again, the problem lies 
in the distinction that we have previously uncovered between micro-
physical identity and lawful microphysical identity. The question, ‘Is 
consciousness physical?,’ also admits of two readings, depending on 
whether we understand physicality in terms of physical microstruc-
ture plus physical laws or simply in terms of physical microstructure 
alone. My own sense is that, though the form of the question itself 
encourages the latter interpretation, to use this question to draw the 
divide between dualism and materialism we would need the former 
interpretation. It does not seem to be enough for the dualist to deny 
that consciousness reduces to physical microstructure. If the reason 
that consciousness does not reduce to physical microstructure is that 
it reduces to physical microstructure plus physical laws, then it seems 
as if we are still, at least broadly speaking, within a materialist view. 
Dualism, in short, requires lawful microphysical irreducibility. 
 What implications does this have for the contours of a dualist 
view? At this point, it might be useful to look briefly at the view that 
Chalmers advocates. Having argued that consciousness does not 
logically supervene on the physical, Chalmers argues that it is none-
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theless plausible to suppose that it naturally supervenes on the physi-
cal. In any world with our natural laws, a being that has the same 
physical microstructure as a conscious being will also be conscious. 
(Note that this means that the zombie world must not be one in which 
our natural laws hold. Moreover, since the zombie world has all the 
same physical laws as the actual world, this also implies that some of 
our natural laws are not physical laws.) In short, on Chalmers’ theory, 
phenomenal facts have a strong, law-governed dependence on the 
physical facts. Nonetheless, he thinks that to account for these phe-
nomenal facts we must postulate new (i.e., nonphysical) fundamental 
properties. Chalmers remains neutral on whether these new funda-
mental properties are phenomenal properties themselves, or proto-
phenomenal properties on which the phenomenal properties super-
vene. In either case, however, he claims there will be new laws speci-
fying the dependence of these new properties on the physical. These 
new laws — what he calls the psychophysical laws — fall outside the 
realm of physics. 
 But now the following question arises. Why do we need to posit 
both new properties and new laws in order to accommodate the lawful 
microphysical irreducibility of consciousness? Granted, once we posit 
the new properties, we might need to posit new laws that govern them, 
but the question I mean to be raising is whether we need to posit the 
new properties at all. Even if we accept Chalmers’ arguments about the 
lawful microphysical irreducibility of consciousness, one might try to 
deny that we are forced this far. All such arguments show is that physical 
properties and the laws of physics are not enough to guarantee the 
existence of consciousness. But why, in order to account for conscious-
ness, must we admit new, nonphysical properties? Why not simply 
admit new laws that are outside the realm of physics? 
 I suspect that Chalmers would have a ready answer to this ques-
tion, namely, that unless there were new, nonphysical properties, 
nothing prevents the new laws from counting as laws of physics. But 
this answer leads us to an interesting result, one that I think puts 
pressure on Chalmers’ argument for the naturalistic component of his 
dualism. His argument depends on the claim that we can conceive of a 
world in which all the physical particles are the same as those in the 
actual world, and in which all the laws of physics hold, and yet in 
which there is no consciousness. But, given his commitment to the 
natural supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical, he must 
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think that if we try to strengthen the thought experiment such that all 
the laws of nature hold in that world, we cannot conceive of that world 
as lacking consciousness. For example, if I try to conceive of my 
physical particles and structure being replicated by some creature in 
the actual world, I should be forced to see such a creature as con-
scious. The laws of nature that are not laws of physics thus play a 
major role in the conceivability of the relevant worlds or individuals. 
Notice, however, that there is no content given to the claim that 
something is a law of nature that is not a law of physics. All we can say 
about such a law is that it governs the (nonphysical) phenomenal 
properties. Importantly, we have no grasp of any such laws independ-
ent of the introduction of these phenomenal properties. And that, I 
would suggest, makes our intuitions about what we can and cannot 
conceive — at least with respect to the laws of nature — significantly 
less reliable. 
 It might appear we are on safer ground when it comes to thought 
experiments involving the laws of physics. But this appearance is 
deceptive. The laws of physics, by stipulation, consist not of the laws 
of current physics but of the laws of a completed physics. That means 
that when we conceive of the zombie world, we are supposed to be 
conceiving of a world in which all the laws of a completed physics 
hold. But in conceiving of the zombie world, we should not assume 
that these laws of physics exhaust the laws of nature; to do so would 
beg the question. Now, with all this on the table, I must confess that 
my confidence that I can conceive of what I am supposed to conceive 
has been significantly shaken. Is there a contradiction lurking in this 
supposition? Given the incompleteness of current physics, I do not see 
how anyone (even someone considerably more versed in the current 
state of physics than I am) could claim to be able to tell one way or 
the other. 
 So, where are we? Ultimately, once we draw the distinction be-
tween microphysical irreducibility and lawful microphysical irreduci-
bility, then assuming (as I have been) that dualism requires the latter, 
the conceivability arguments in its favor are deprived of much of their 
intuitive force. Perhaps the dualist will retreat to the claim that his 
view requires only microphysical irreducibility. If this is the case, 
however, then the contrast between dualism and materialism is, I 
Amy Kind 250
think, deprived of much of its interest. If consciousness is merely 
microphysically irreducible, then we can draw the conclusion that the 
existence of consciousness depends very closely on the laws of phys-
ics. And, importantly, that seems something with which the material-
ist could well be content. 
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